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Abstract: Time sensitivity seems to affect our intuitive evaluation of 
the reasonable risk of fallibility in testimonies. All things being equal, 
we tend to be less demanding in accepting time sensitive testimonies 
as opposed to time insensitive testimonies. This paper considers this 
intuitive response to testimonies as a strategy of acceptance. It argues 
that the intuitive strategy, which takes time sensitivity into account, 
is epistemically superior to two adjacent strategies that do not: the 
undemanding strategy adopted by non-reductionists and the cautious 
strategy adopted by reductionists. The paper demonstrates that in 
adopting the intuitive strategy of acceptance, one is likely to form 
more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs. Also, in following the intui-
tive strategy, the listener will be fulfilling his epistemic duties more 
efficiently. 
Keywords: Acceptance of testimony; time sensitivity; reductionism; 
non-reductionism. 
1. Introduction 
 Testimony occupies a central place in everyone’s epistemic sphere. We 
depend on testimony for a wide variety of beliefs, which might range from 
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directions to the nearby petrol station to medical breakthroughs; from 
knowing the birthday of a historical figure to knowing one’s own birthday.  
 Epistemologists seem to agree on two main points with regard to testi-
mony: (1) testimony has immense value and is indispensable for our epis-
temic system; and (2) testimony is fallible since attesters can be unreliable 
or insincere. Accordingly, the person who is concerned with merely maxim-
izing their knowledge through testimony is likely to be susceptible to de-
ception. On the other hand, if one seeks to avoid recourse to testimony 
altogether and maintain one’s epistemic autonomy, one will have an ex-
tremely limited range of knowledge that might perhaps be insufficient for 
basic survival.1 Thus, one needs to accept, as most people do, the fact that, 
when incorporating testimony into one’s epistemic system, the epistemic 
agent makes himself (to a degree) vulnerable to fallibility. This is the price 
paid for the knowledge that he is able to obtain. As Richard Moran states: 
‘[M]y ultimate destination is the truth about the world, but often I must 
pass through the beliefs of another person as my only (fallible) access to 
this truth’ (Moran 2006, 278). However, the price (i.e. the risk of fallibility) 
needs to be reasonable, as we do not want to end up with a large number 
of false beliefs. When we are presented with a testimony, we intuitively 
evaluate the risk of fallibility associated with it in order to reach a verdict 
about whether the risk of fallibility is or is not reasonable. Accordingly, we 
can decide whether or not we are willing to accept the testimony.  
 In this paper, I will first demonstrate how time sensitivity has an impact 
on our acceptance of testimony by affecting our intuitive evaluation of the 
reasonable risk of fallibility in that testimony. All things being equal, we 
tend to be less demanding in our acceptance of time sensitive testimonies 
than we are with time insensitive testimonies. I will develop this intuitive 
response to testimonies into a strategy of acceptance. I will then argue that 
what I call the intuitive strategy of acceptance is epistemically superior to 
                                                 
1  In making a similar point about acceptance in general, Richard Feldman states: 
‘We can succeed in believing lots of truths by believing everything. […] But that 
hardly achieves any sort of epistemic excellence. On the other hand, by believing 
very little we surely manage to avoid error. But this excessive conservativism does 
not achieve epistemic excellence either. It is by attaining a suitable mix of the two 
goals that we will achieve epistemic excellence’ (Feldman 1988, 244). 
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two adjacent strategies: the undemanding strategy adopted by non-reduc-
tionists, and the cautious strategy adopted by reductionists. I demonstrate 
that, in adopting the intuitive strategy of acceptance, which takes time 
sensitivity into account, one is likely to form more true beliefs and fewer 
false beliefs. Also, in following the intuitive strategy, the listener will be 
fulfilling his epistemic duties more efficiently.  
2. Time sensitivity and testimony 
 Testimonies vary with regard to their time sensitivity. Some are bound 
to a tight timeframe: if one does not form a belief about the testimony 
within the particular timeframe, it will become epistemically valueless. 
Other testimonies are not time sensitive: one could delay forming the beliefs 
associated with them without any effect on their epistemic value to the 
listener. A testimony, though, could be time sensitive with respect to several 
considerations such as truth, justification/warrant, belief/acceptance, and 
probably others. In this paper, I am merely concerned with time sensitivity 
with respect to the truth of the testimony. To understand this point, let us 
consider the following example. Assume that you are late for a job interview 
and you get to the company’s building and ask a stranger about the location 
of the interview. He tells you that it is taking place in the conference room 
and gives you directions to the place. You can either accept (or reject) the 
stranger’s claim right away or withhold acceptance (for further investiga-
tion for instance). If you withhold your acceptance for a while, there will 
probably no longer be a current job interview. Thus, you miss the oppor-
tunity to have a belief altogether, since even if you decide to form a belief 
later, your belief will not be about the place of the current job interview; 
rather, it will be about something different—the place of a past job inter-
view. The truth of the proposition ‘the interview is taking place in the 
conference room’ is bound to a specific timeframe (i.e., the real time of the 
interview). That is, outside of this timeframe, the proposition would not be 
true (i.e., there will not be an interview that is taking place now in the 
conference room). 
 In the above example, it seems that intuitively one is likely to be more 
lenient and accept the testimony. When we ask strangers about directions 
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to an office (or a gate), we tend to believe them readily. But does the ele-
ment of time sensitivity have any impact on our intuitive undemanding 
acceptance of some testimonies? I believe the answer is affirmative. To test 
this hypothesis, let us compare two similar examples where the main differ-
ence between them is that one is time sensitive and the other is not:  
 1. A stranger identifies himself as a pediatrician to a mother and child 
waiting at a bus station and diagnoses the child with a non-urgent 
illness, prescribing a particular medicine. 
 2. As her child is choking and about to become unconscious, a stranger 
comes to the mother and identifies himself as a doctor. He tells the 
mother that her child needs an emergency tracheotomy and volun-
teers to perform it. 
 Let us assume that the stranger in both situations is the same person 
and that there are no clues that either undermine or strengthen his sincerity 
and reliability. All the mother has is the stranger’s word. It seems that in 
the first example the mother would be warranted to withhold belief regard-
ing both of the stranger’s testimonies—that he is a doctor and that her 
child is sick and needs a particular medicine. She might bear in mind what 
the stranger says and decide to ask the family’s GP the next time she visits, 
but it seems unwarranted to form a belief about her child’s health based 
merely on a diagnosis made by a stranger.  
 On the other hand, in the second scenario, the mother would seem to be 
warranted in accepting the stranger’s testimony that he is a doctor and that 
the child needs a critical procedure. This would be the expected and, per-
haps, actual reaction of many people in a similar situation. It is quite com-
mon for people, in an emergency, to believe strangers’ claims that they are 
doctors and to trust their claims about the situation of the ill (on airplanes, 
for instance). 
 Accordingly, the mother seems justified in both withholding belief about 
the first testimony and in accepting the second testimony, even though they 
are produced by the same person and contain fairly similar propositions. 
Apparently, what differentiates the two cases is the fact that, while the first 
testimony is fairly time insensitive, the second is very time sensitive. In the 
first example, the mother does not have to form a belief immediately (or 
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perhaps ever). She has the time, if she wishes to accept the testimony, to 
evaluate the sincerity and reliability of the attester. In the second case, 
however, the mother does not have the luxury of time to reflect carefully 
on the testimony and on the character of her interlocutor, as she has to 
accept (or reject) the testimony right away. Accordingly, even though the 
risk of fallibility (that the proposition is false) is fairly similar in both tes-
timonies, the mother shows more tolerance towards the second than the 
first testimony. She seems to evaluate the risk of fallibility of the second 
(but not the first) testimony as reasonable. Her stance appears to be intui-
tively compelling. Since there was no difference between the risk of fallibility 
of the two testimonies, what makes the fallibility of the second testimony 
intuitively reasonable is apparently the fact that it is very time sensitive. It 
seems, therefore, that time sensitivity affects our intuitive evaluation of the 
risk of fallibility and of what is reasonable when accepting testimonies. 
3. The intuitive strategy of acceptance 
 Our intuitive response to testimonies (as represented by the examples 
of the mother(s) and the alleged doctor) could be developed into a strategy 
of acceptance. This strategy assumes that one is warranted in accepting 
a time sensitive testimony at face value unless there are reasons that might 
undermine the reliability or sincerity of the attester. Further, it maintains 
that one is warranted in withholding one’s acceptance of time insensitive 
testimonies unless there are positive reasons for the sincerity and reliability 
of the attester. I call this the intuitive strategy of acceptance. 
 There are two other competing strategies of acceptance. The first is the 
undemanding strategy that advances that our response to testimonies must 
be one of unchallenging acceptance. It proposes that one is justified in ac-
cepting a testimony as long as there is no reason to believe that one’s in-
terlocutor is insincere or unreliable. The second is the cautious strategy that 
advances that our acceptance of testimony must be conditioned. One is 
justified in accepting a testimony only if one possesses reasons to suggest that 
one’s interlocutor is sincere and reliable. Advocates of the first strategy, 
which is typically traced back to Reid, include non-reductionists like Coady 
(1992), Burge (1997), and Weiner (2003), among others. Advocates of the 
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second strategy, which is typically traced back to Hume, include reduction-
ists like Audi (1997), Lackey (2003), and E. Fricker (1995), among others.  
 Unlike the intuitive strategy, both of these strategies do not seem to 
consider time sensitivity a relevant factor in accepting testimonies. Appar-
ently, in both strategies, the reasonable risk of fallibility in testimonies is 
fixed and remains constant across all instances of testimony. The two strat-
egies differ, however, in their evaluation of the reasonable risk of fallibility 
in testimonies. On the one hand, the undemanding strategy seems to main-
tain that initially the reasonable risk of fallibility in testimony is identical 
to the risk of fallibility in testimony in general. Hence, it advocates accept-
ing a testimony at face value unless there are positive reasons that might 
raise the risk of fallibility with a particular testimony (i.e. that one’s inter-
locutor is insincere or unreliable). On the other hand, the cautious strategy 
seems to maintain that the risk of fallibility in testimony in general is ini-
tially higher than the reasonable risk of fallibility. Hence, this strategy re-
quires positive reasons in order to reduce the risk of fallibility to the rea-
sonable level so that the testimony might be considered acceptable (i.e. by 
confirming sincerity and reliability).   
 Besides being intuitively appealing, I maintain that the intuitive strat-
egy is also epistemically superior to both the undemanding and cautious 
strategies. I provide two arguments in support of my claim. 
 First, the intuitive strategy has an advantage over the undemanding 
and cautious strategies with respect to providing more true beliefs and fewer 
false beliefs through testimony. To demonstrate, I will test the three strat-
egies on all of the possible instances of testimony in relation to time sensi-
tivity and truth and falsity, which are: (1) A testimony that is true and 
time sensitive; (2) a testimony that is false and time insensitive; (3) a tes-
timony that is true and time insensitive; (4) a testimony that is false and 
time sensitive (see Table 1).  
 For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that there is no immediately 
available reason that undermines or supports the sincerity and reliability 
of the interlocutor in each of the four testimonies. However, I will assume 
that the sincerity and reliability of the interlocutor could be known 
through further investigation (which also, I assume, takes time). In addi-
tion, I will assume that the essential factor in determining the truth or 
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falsity of a testimony is the sincerity and reliability of the attester because 
the probability that the testimony is true is high if the attester is sincere 
and reliable and is low if he is not. I am aware that it is possible, however, 
that a testimony could be true even if the attester were neither sincere nor 
reliable, or false even if he were both sincere and reliable. Since the proba-
bilities of such occurrences are quite low, I will omit them in my analysis 
below for the sake of simplicity.  
 Given the above, let us move to test the three strategies. In adopting 
the intuitive strategy of acceptance in handling the testimonies in table 1, 
with everything being equal, I will end up with three true beliefs and one 
false belief. Following this strategy, I will accept testimony number one at 
face value since it is time sensitive, and from this will follow a true belief. 
Since it is time insensitive, I will inquire about the sincerity and reliability 
of the attester when I am presented with testimony number two. This 
should suggest that the testimony is false and hence will lead to another 
true belief. The same goes with testimony number three, except here I will 
realize that the testimony contains a true proposition. Finally, since it is 
time sensitive, I will accept testimony number four without further investi-
gation, which will result in a false belief. Accordingly, following the intuitive 
strategy leads me to three true beliefs and one false belief.  
 In adopting the undemanding strategy, however, I will end up with two 
true beliefs and two false beliefs. Since there is nothing that would under-
mine the sincerity and reliability of the attesters, I will accept all four tes-
timonies at face value without further investigation, regardless of their time 
sensitivity.  
 Finally, in adopting the cautious strategy, I will end up with two true 
beliefs only. Since there is no available information that strengthens the 
Testimony True/False Time Sensitivity 
Testimony 1 True Time Sensitive 
Testimony 2 False Time Insensitive 
Testimony 3 True Time Insensitive 
Testimony 4 False Time Sensitive 
Table 1 
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sincerity and reliability of the attester, I will investigate their sincerity and 
reliability in all four instances. Accordingly, I will form true beliefs about 
the time insensitive testimonies, but will fail to form beliefs about the time 
sensitive ones.   
 In examining the results of following these strategies, one should notice 
that the intuitive strategy is indeed epistemically superior. While we will 
gain at best two true beliefs following the other two strategies, we will form 
three true beliefs following the intuitive strategy. Between the two other 
strategies, however, the cautious strategy seems to be preferable since it 
will result in its follower forming two true beliefs and no false beliefs. This 
can be compared to the undemanding strategy, which adopts an overly 
tolerant approach that will lead to its follower forming two false beliefs and 
two true beliefs. 
 The second reason for adopting the intuitive strategy is that, in follow-
ing it, we are better fulfilling our epistemic duties than if we followed either 
the undemanding or the cautious strategies. Fulfilling epistemic duties 
means that, in forming a belief, the agent exhausts the available means and 
sources to attain truth and avoid error. When a testimony is time sensitive 
and there is nothing that undermines the sincerity and reliability of the 
attester, the word of the attester is usually the only source available to the 
listener. Further, when a testimony is time insensitive, there are usually 
other means and sources available to the listener through which he could 
determine the sincerity and reliability of his interlocutor. Therefore, by de-
pending on the words of the attester—which are the only source available 
to the listener in a time sensitive testimony—the listener is exhausting all 
of the available means, and thus he is fulfilling his epistemic duty. On the 
other hand, by enquiring further about the sincerity and reliability of his 
attester in time insensitive testimony, the listener, then (and only then), 
exhausts the available sources and means. Only the intuitive strategy yokes 
these two modes together.      
 In following the undemanding strategy, however, the epistemic agent 
would fail to fulfill his epistemic duties in certain instances. To demonstrate, 
let us go back to the time insensitive example of the mother and the stranger 
who claims that her child is sick. In that example, the character of the 
attester is opaque. The undemanding strategy would encourage the mother 
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to believe the stranger right away even if there are means available to en-
quire about his sincerity and reliability. This seems problematic; to appre-
ciate this, let us assume that the mother knows that the stranger is a friend 
of her cousin Sally, whom she is just about to meet. Yet, she chooses to 
believe the stranger’s claims at face value without consulting her cousin at 
all. Apparently, by doing so the mother would not be fulfilling her epistemic 
duties efficiently as this option would make her unnecessarily vulnerable to 
error. All things being equal, the mother as an epistemic agent should do 
what is better for attaining truth and avoiding error. Since the situation is 
not time sensitive, what is better for attaining truth and avoiding error is 
clearly the one where she enquires about the sincerity and reliability of the 
attester. The vulnerability to fallibility in testimonies is something one can-
not avoid altogether, but at the same time it is something that one should 
not go through without a good reason. Therefore, on certain occasions, the 
undemanding strategy fails to enable the listener to fulfill his epistemic du-
ties. 
 On the other hand, the cautious strategy seems to ask too much of the 
listener and in adopting it the listener might, in some instances, also fail to 
fulfill his epistemic duty to accept a testimony. To understand this point, 
let us re-examine the example of the time sensitive testimony of the alleged 
doctor and the choking child. According to the cautious strategy, the 
mother is not justified in accepting the claims of the stranger until she 
investigates his sincerity and reliability. This requirement seems problem-
atic. Since the testimony is time sensitive, by accepting the words of the 
stranger, the mother seems to exhaust all of the available means and 
sources to justify her acceptance. Anything beyond what is available to 
the mother should not be part of her epistemic duty, and in that instance, 
investigating the sincerity and reliability of the stranger is beyond her 
available sources. If she investigates the sincerity and reliability of the 
stranger, the child will probably die in the process and the stranger’s 
testimony that ‘I can save the child’ will become void. Indeed, not accept-
ing the testimony while exhausting all the available justifications for it is 
failing to fulfill one’s epistemic duty to accept a relevant proposition. 
Hence, the cautious strategy also fails to provide a means of maintaining 
the listener’s epistemic duties. 
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 In comparing the three competing strategies, one should notice that the 
intuitive strategy appears favorable as it helps the listener to fulfill his ep-
istemic duty more efficiently than either the undemanding or the cautious 
strategies.  
4. Potential objections to the intuitive strategy  
of acceptance 
 There are two potential objections to the intuitive strategy of ac-
ceptance. The first targets the concept of time sensitivity upon which 
I based the intuitive strategy. The second targets my argument for the in-
tuitive strategy in which I argued that the strategy has an advantage over 
the undemanding and cautious strategies with respect to providing more 
true beliefs and fewer false beliefs through testimony.  
 First, one might object that time sensitivity is a relative concept. There 
is no clear distinction between a time sensitive testimony and a time insen-
sitive testimony. On the other hand, however, the intuitive strategy seems 
to assume a clear distinction between the two and it seems to be based upon 
that distinction. Since the distinction is indeed unclear, the intuitive strat-
egy is useless. 
 This objection, however, is not compelling. The distinction between time 
sensitive and time insensitive testimony is only unclear if one considers time 
sensitivity unconditionally, which is not the case with the intuitive strategy. 
In fact, the time sensitivity/insensitivity of testimony is considered with 
respect to the relevant instance in which the testimony is presented. With 
time sensitivity being conditioned in this manner, the distinction between 
time sensitive and time insensitive testimony becomes clear. Accordingly, 
the question one should ask is whether or not one can investigate the relia-
bility and sincerity of the attester further without the testimony losing its 
value with respect to the instance in which the testimony is presented. If 
the answer to that question is affirmative then the testimony is time insen-
sitive, and if the answer is negative then the testimony is time sensitive. To 
illustrate, let us reexamine the alleged doctor examples introduced above. 
In the first example,  
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 1. A stranger identifies himself as a pediatrician to a mother and child 
waiting at a bus station and diagnoses the child with a non-urgent 
illness, prescribing a particular medicine.  
In this example, we notice that the mother has the time to investigate fur-
ther the reliability and sincerity of the attester. She has time to do so with 
respect to the instance itself. The truth of the testimony should not change 
while the mother investigates further. The testimony, therefore, is time in-
sensitive.  
 Things are different with the second example: 
 2. As her child is choking and about to become unconscious, a stranger 
comes to the mother and identifies himself as a doctor. He tells the 
mother that her child needs an emergency tracheotomy and volun-
teers to perform it. 
In this example, we notice that the truth of the testimony would probably 
change if the mother investigates the reliability and sincerity of the attester 
further since the child might die, for instance. The mother does not have 
time to investigate further with respect to the instance itself. Since the 
mother cannot investigate further without rendering the testimony value-
less, this testimony, therefore, is time sensitive. Notice that apart from the 
instance itself, some parts of the testimony can be considered time insensi-
tive, such as the attester’s testimony that he is a doctor. This sense of time 
sensitivity is, however, irrelevant to my proposition. Therefore, the first 
objection fails. There is indeed a clear distinction between time sensitive 
and time insensitive testimony if the concepts were conditioned to the in-
stance where the testimony is presented and are considered with respect to 
the truth of the testimony in particular.   
 The second objection might be offered to my argument for the intuitive 
strategy, in which I postulated that the intuitive strategy has an advantage 
over the undemanding and cautious strategies with respect to providing 
more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs. One might object that my argument 
presupposes an equal distribution of true and false testimony across time 
sensitive and time insensitive testimony while this might not be the case. 
Namely, it might be that, in reality, there are, for example, far more false 
time sensitive testimonies than true time sensitive testimonies. Therefore, 
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in practice, the strategy would not help one in obtaining more true beliefs 
and fewer false beliefs as it is claimed.  
 This objection, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the superi-
ority of the intuitive strategy defended above. There are two ways to rep-
resent my argument for the intuitive strategy. In this objection, it seems to 
be represented as follows: 
 (1)  A testimony comes in four forms: a true time sensitive testimony; 
a true time insensitive testimony; a false time sensitive testimony; 
and a false time insensitive testimony. 
 (2)  All instances of testimony in the real world distribute evenly among 
the four forms above. 
 (3)  Following the intuitive strategy will lead one to obtain true beliefs 
through testimony three out of four times. 
 (4)  Following the undemanding or the cautious strategies will lead one 
to obtain true beliefs two out of four times. 
Therefore, following the intuitive strategy leads one to have more true be-
liefs and fewer false beliefs through testimony.  
 If one understands my argument as such, then it is obvious that premise 
two is incorrect and, hence, the argument is unsound. This, however, is 
a misrepresentation of the argument. The argument should read as follows:  
 (1)  A testimony comes in four forms: a true time sensitive testimony; 
a true time insensitive testimony; a false time sensitive testimony; 
and a false time insensitive testimony. 
 (2)  External factors determine how instances of testimony in the real 
world distribute among the four forms. 
 (3)  Isolated from external factors, instances of testimony should dis-
tribute evenly among the four forms. 
 (4)  Isolated from external factors, the intuitive strategy will lead one 
to obtain true beliefs through testimony three out of four times. 
 (5)  Isolated from external factors, the undemanding or the cautious 
strategies will lead one to obtain true beliefs two out of four times. 
 (6)  Hence, isolated from external factors, the intuitive strategy leads 
one to have more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs through testi-
mony. 
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Therefore, the intuitive strategy has an inherent advantage over the unde-
manding and cautious strategies with respect to providing more true beliefs 
and fewer false beliefs. 
  However, the question might arise as to what justifies isolating external 
factors of testimony in premises 3–5 in my argument above.  
 External factors (i.e., the actual contexts in which testimony is given) 
vary significantly and perhaps, when taking these into account, there will 
not be a single, unconditional, advantageous strategy. Different contexts 
will require different strategies of acceptance. For instance, knowing that 
stand-up comedians tend to lie in their stories to enhance the humor, we 
would perhaps be wise to adopt the demanding strategy when accepting 
their testimony. In addition, knowing that doctors are reliable and tend to 
tell the truth when discussing the results of tests with patients, the unde-
manding strategy would appear to be the most advantageous strategy to 
adopt in such instances. No doubt, this is practically helpful. However, when 
taking external factors into consideration, we will recognize, if we are suc-
cessful, which strategy is better relative to a specific context. This, however, 
is irrelevant to my argument. The aim of my argument is to establish that 
the intuitive strategy is internally, or in theory, relatively advantageous in 
providing more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs. This advantage cannot 
be examined unless we isolate testimony from external factors. I am aware, 
though, that this internal advantage might be overpowered or cancelled out 
by external factors in actual contexts. It is an advantage nonetheless. Hence, 
the second objection is irrelevant.  
 Finally, it might be worthwhile noting that the intuitive strategy is con-
cerned principally with achieving more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs. 
In some cases, however, getting things right might not be essential (as in 
the case of the stand-up comedian’s stories mentioned previously). The in-
tuitive strategy seems to be unhelpful in such cases. Yet, this should not be 
a disadvantage for the strategy for two reasons. First, the primary aim of 
any strategy of acceptance (indeed, the primary epistemic aim simpliciter) 
is to obtain true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. This is also the main epis-
temic duty required by epistemic agents. Other advantages, if they are rel-
evant (like differentiating between significant and less significant testi-
mony), should be secondary to the primary epistemic aim. Secondary  
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advantages could always be supplemented by other tools. As long as the 
strategy does not obstruct the secondary advantages, there seems to be 
nothing objectionable about it.  
 The second and more important reason is that while judging the truth 
of testimony is something absolutely objective, determining the signifi-
cance of the testimony could be widely subjective and relative to a par-
ticular listener (or a group of listeners). What is important to one person 
might be trivial to another. It should not be a disadvantage of any strat-
egy if it fails to account for the relative and various personal preferences 
of listeners. 
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have defended the intuitive strategy of acceptance which, 
unlike competing strategies, takes into account the time sensitivity of the 
testimony. I have argued that the intuitive strategy is epistemically superior 
to the adjacent strategies of acceptance: the undemanding strategy and the 
cautious strategy. One is likely to obtain more true beliefs and fewer false 
beliefs in adopting the intuitive strategy. Additionally, in following the in-
tuitive strategy, one fulfills one’s epistemic duties more efficiently than 
would be the case with either of the two other strategies. 
References 
Audi, Robert. 1997. “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Jus-
tification.” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4): 405–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.001.0001 
Burge, Tyler. 1997. “Interlocution, Perception, Memory.” Philosophical Studies 86 
(1): 21–47. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.001.0001 
Coady, Cecil A.J. 1992. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198235518.001.0001 
Feldman, Richard. 1988. “Epistemic Obligations.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 
235–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214076 
Fricker, Elizabeth. 1995. “Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reduction-
ism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Mind 104 (414): 393–411. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/104.414.393 
436  Nader Alsamaani 
Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 422–436 
Lackey, Jennifer. 2003. “A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Episte-
mology of Testimony.” Noûs 37 (4): 706–23. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-
0068.2003.00457.x 
Moran, Richard. 2006. “Getting Told and Being Believed.” In The Epistemology of 
Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, 272–306. New York: 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ac-
prof:oso/9780199276011.003.0013 
Weiner, Matthew. 2003. “Accepting Testimony.” Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211): 
256–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00310 
